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I. INTRODUCTION
The radical shift in and expansion of the concepts of
European law wrought by the now more than five-year-old Treaty
on European Union (TEU)l are not fully appreciated in the United
States. Until the TEU of 1992, European law was bounded by the
reasonably well-defined and understood contours of the Treaty of

* Professor of Law and Director of International Studies, Law School,
A.B., J.D., Villanova University; LL.M., Columbia
University of Richmond.
University. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Hunton &
Williams Summer Research Fund, Law School, University of Richmond
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1,
1.
[hereinafter TEU].
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Rome and its amendments. 2 The expressly political TEU added
new dimensions to European law, the relationships among the
Member States, and the scope of activities to be pursued by the
European Union. This expansion was accomplished through,
among other provisions, (1) the TEU's monetary union provisions;
(2) its grant of citizenship in the European Union (EU) to all
citizens of the Member States; (3) its social provisions; and (4) its
different areas of emphasis within the relations among the
Member States and between the Member States and the
European Community (EC) treaty institutions. In reality, an
understanding of the more tightly-focused EC now provides only
an incomplete appreciation of post-TEU era law and affairs.
Although the implications of the TEU are only becoming fully
understood in the United States, another wave of modification
and change is on the horizon.
In October 1997, the Member States of the EU signed another
treaty, which will bring even more change for the EC. The Treaty
of Amsterdam (AT)3 was signed by the Member States at the
conclusion of an Intergovernmental Conference held at the
direction of the TEU.4 This Conference was held over a sixteen
month period, culminating in June 1997, with agreement on the
text of a draft of the Treaty.5 The TEU envisioned that the

2.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter E.E.C. TREATY] as amended by, among other

agreements, the Single European Act, Feb.
[hereinafter SEA].

3.

17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1

Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the

Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct.
2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter AT]. See generally THE TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM: TEXT AND COMMENTARY (Andrew Duff ed., 1997) [hereinafter AT: TEXT
AND COMMENTARY]; Sally Langrish, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected Highlights,
23 EUR. L. REv. 3 (1998); Philippe Manin, The Treaty of Amsterdam, 4 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 1 (1998); Michel Petite, The Treaty of Amsterdam, (last visited Aug. 31,
1998) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-2>.
The AT is currently in the process of ratification by the Member States. It is
difficult to predict the Treaty's effective date. It can only become effective upon
ratification by each Member State, and the ratification process varies from

Member to Member. In some States referendums will be necessary; in others
internal legislative or constitutional changes may be required to accommodate
some of the AT's provisions. The process is expected to take at least a year from
the signing in October, 1997. Manin, supra.
4.
TEU, art. 2. See generally REVIEWING MAASTRICHT: ISSUES FOR THE 1996
IGC (Alan Dashwood ed., 1996).
5.
The Intergovernmental Conference formally began in Turin, Italy in
March, 1996 (see Intergovernmental Conference, 29 BULL. E.U. 3-1996, 11.4) and

concluded with agreement on the
Amsterdam in June, 1997; see
European Council, 30 BULL. E.U.
summer and the treaty was signed
supranote 3, at 3.

substance of the draft text of the treaty in
Conclusions of the Presidency, Amsterdam
6-1997, 1.2. The draft was edited over the
in Amsterdam on October 2, 1997. Langrish,
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Conference would review and reassess the provisions of the TEU

with the aim of improving their effectiveness. 6 In this respect, the
AT does address the agenda set forth in the TEU because the AT
amplifies and clarifies the provisions of the TEU. 7 However, the
Treaty falls far short of the ambitious agenda some had hoped it
would accomplish.8

At the Corfu Summit in July 1994, the European Council requested the EU
institutions to prepare separate reports on the worldngs of the TEU. Manin,
supra note 3, at 2. Based on these reports, the European Council adopted a
preliminary report on the functioning of the TEU. The European Council formed a
Reflection Group chaired by Carlos Westendorp of Spain to prepare for the
Conference. Manin, id. at n.8. By the end of 1995 that group submitted its own
report which identified three principal areas of concern for consideration by the
Intergovernmental Conference: 1) the EU's closeness and relevance to the
citizens of the Member States; 2) increased efficacy of the institutions as the
Union prepares for enlargement; and 3) strengthening of the European Union's
powers and presence in the foreign policy area. Reflection Group's Report (Dec. 5,
1995), <http:/ /europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/reflect/fnal.html>
[hereinafter Reflection Group's Report]. The Commission issued a press release in
reaction to the Reflection Group Report, Press Release: Intergovernmental
Conference 1996: Commission Reacts to Westendorp Report (Dec. 6, 1998),
<http: / /europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ eu-doc/commissn/press-r.html>
[hereinafter Press Release]. The Commission also issued an opinion with respect
to the holding of the IGC, Commission Opinion: "Reinforcing Political Union and
Preparingfor Enlargement" (Feb. 28, 1996), <http://europa.ev.int/en/agenda/igchome/eu-doc/commissn/avis-en.html> [hereinafter Commission Opinion]. At the
opening session of the Intergovernmental Conference during the Turin European

Council meeting, it was agreed that the agenda for the Conference should center
around three topics: 1) bringing the Union closer to its citizens; 2) making the
institutions more efficient and democratic; and 3) strengthening the Union's
external relations capabilities. Manin, supra note 3, at 3. These are the topics
emphasized in the Reflection Group's Report: The 1996 Conference, supra. For
summaries of the history of the Intergovernmental Conference, see GEORGE A.
BERMANN,

ET AL.,

1998

SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS

ON EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY LAW 5 (1998); Langrish, supranote 3, at 3; Manin, supra note 3, at 3;
Petite, supra note 3, at 1-4. See generally Lamberto Dini, The European Union
afterAmsterdam, in AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at xxvii.
6.
TEU, art. 2.
7.
Andrew Duff, Supranational Institutionfor PostnationalEurope, in AT:
TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supranote 3, at xxx-xxvi.
8.
Many had hoped that among other things, agreement would be
reached at the Intergovernmental Conference on the issue of the size of the
Commission and on a reform of the voting within the Council to eliminate
unanimous voting, except on defense matters. Both of these issues are critical for
the Union, all the more so in view of the prospect of further enlargement of the
80, 99-105, 113Union. See, e.g., Reflection Group's Report, supranote 5, at
18 (discussing enlargement and voting); Press Release, supra note 5, at pt.2
40-42
(discussing enlargement); Commission Opinion, supra note 5, at
Presidency's Progress Report on the
(discussing voting and enlargement);
Intergovernmental Conference, in Annexes to the Conclusions of the Presidency
(Florence) 29 BULL. E.U. No. 6, 50, 55 [hereinafter Presidency Progress Report];
DINI, supra note 5, at xxvii; Commentary: Disappointment on Enlargement-and
Another IGC to Come, AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supranote 3, at 130; Langrish,
supranote 3, at 4; Manin, supranote 3, at 8; Petite, supranote 3.
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Briefly stated, the TEU established an architecture for the EU
and created a set of working relationships between the treatyestablished institutions and the Member States broader than that
which was realized under the EC Treaty and its aquis. Through
the TEU, the EU is said to rest on three pillars. 9 The EC Treaty
and its aquis are the first pillar of this structure. The other two
pillars are the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP)1 0 and
Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs. 1 1 These
latter two pillars are innovations of the TEU.
Among the characteristics of these latter two pillars is the
intergovernmental nature of their objectives and of the procedures
established to accomplish those objectives. In contrast, the first
pillar, the EC, is institutional in character. The TEU's second and
third pillars require the Member States, through the Council of

In a Protocol to the AT the signatory states agreed that at least a year before
the membership in the Union exceeds twenty, another intergovernmental
conference will be convened to carry out a comprehensive review of the Treaty
provisions regarding the composition and functioning of the institutions. Protocol
on the Institutions with the Prospect of Enlargement of the European Union, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 111 [hereinafter Protocol on the Institutions]. The Commission has
recommended that negotiations be opened with six applicant states, Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Agenda 2000-For a
Stronger and Wider Union, 30 BULL. E. U. (Supp. 5/97), 54, 57-59. Thus, the
Union could consist of 21 Member States at its next enlargement. In this same
Protocol the signatories agreed that at the date of the next enlargement the
Commission should be composed of one national from each Member State, if the
voting in the Council has been modified in a way acceptable to all the Member
States. Such modification in the voting is to take into account all relevant factors,
including the possible need to compensate with additional voting power those
larger Member States which would lose a second member of the Commission.
Protocol on the Institutions, supra, art. 1.
9.
P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 5 (6th ed. 1995)
[hereinafter MATHIJSEN].

10.
TEU, arts. J-J.11.
11.
Id. arts. K-K.9. Important and ambitious as they are, the TEU's
provisions establishing the monetary union, with its separate institutions, are not
accorded a separate pillar. These provisions are contained within the EC title of
the TEU and are thus part of the first pillar. In its current configuration, the EU
might be analogized, although perhaps unfairly, to a three legged stool or tripod
in which one leg is sturdy and well-developed and the other two are less secure
and currently under construction. More often the Union is visually depicted as
the facade of a Greek temple in which the three pillars support the overarching
pediment which represents the Union.
The AT blurs this representation
somewhat as it would bring a significant portion of the matters which the TEU
treated as part of the third pillar within the EC and its acquis. The TEU
provisions amending the E.C. Treaty, including the monetary union provisions,
were carefully drafted and negotiated. In contrast, the other portions of the TEU,
especially many of the intergovernmental relations provisions of the CFSP and the
Justice and Home Affairs portions were hastily prepared, and are neither as well
drafted nor as well thought through as the EC provisions. See generally Petite,
supra note 3 (evaluating and comparing Commission Opinion goals to AT
accomplishments).
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Ministers and the European Council, to work to secure their
objectives. The EC institutions, however, are responsible for
carrying out EC objectives. Also, these latter two pillars, unlike
the first, are outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice. 12
One of the goals of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conferenceas envisioned in the TEU-was the strengthening of the CFSP
based on the approximately four years of experience that had
accrued since TEU implementation in 1992. The purpose of this
Article is to consider some issues presented with regard to the
second pillar, the CFSP, and to assess the AT's provisions
regarding the CFSP. I3
The Treaty of Rome did not provide for consideration of
foreign policy and security matters apart from treatment in those

areas within the Community's exclusive competency, such as
commercial policy. Indeed, the external aspects of even explicit
Community competencies are not clearly delineated in the Treaty
of Rome.1 4 However, treating foreign and security policy matters
as legitimate areas of Community concern and activity did not
spring forth in the TEU from a void. For many years the Member
States, with increasing coordination and support from the
Commission, had dealt with these matters within the context of
European Political Co-Operation (EPC).' 5 The Single European
Act of 1986 (SEA) institutionalized these cooperative and
But in 1992 the TEU significantly
collaborative procedures.
elevated and regularized these areas of concerted effort.
Accordingly, cooperation and coordination in matters of foreign
policy evolved from an acknowledged and valued-although purely
extra-Community-activity prior to the SEA to one of the three
fundamental pillars upon which the entire structure of the
European Union rests. This development occurred in less than a
decade. This shift from a somewhat ancillary activity to a core
endeavor evidences the ambition articulated in the TEU that the
Union attain and exercise an international presence befitting a
significant world power.16

Article L of the TEU provides that the jurisdiction of the Court of
12.
Justice is limited to the first pillar (the EC), one provision within the third pillar,
and Articles L through S, the Final Articles of the TEU. The AT would expand the
Court's jurisdiction to cover many provisions of the restated third pillar. AT, art.

L.
The emphasis is on the structure of CFSP and its operation in foreign
13.
policy areas. Less attention is given to the security aspects. The structure and
procedures, however, are the same for both aspects.
See infra notes 101, 147-52 and accompanying text.
14.
See generally SIMON J. NUTTALL, EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION
15.
(1992).

One of the objectives of the Union is that it "assert its identity on the
16.
international scene...." TEU, art. B. Also, in one of the recitals at the outset of
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Part II of this Article delineates the structure and procedures
of CFSP under the TEU, discusses the roles of the EC institutions
that are involved in the CFSP, and addresses consistency between
actions taken under the first and second pillars of the TEU, and
consistency among actions within CFSP. Part III describes the
portions of the AT that affect CFSP.

II. CFSP UNDER THE TREATY OF EUROPEAN UNION
A. Structure and Procedures
The TEU emphasized the significance of the sphere of foreign
and security policy by elevating it to one of the three pillars of the
European Union. Title V of the TEU contains essentially all of the
TEU's provisions regarding the CFSP. In that Title the European
Union as an entity and the Member States individually commit
themselves to defining and implementing a common foreign and
security policy. 17 The objectives of this common policy are: to
safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, and
independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the
Union and its members; to preserve the peace; to develop and
consolidate democracy; to reinforce the rule of law; and to foster
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.'
More
boldly, the Member States provide in the TEU that "[a] common
foreign and security policy is hereby established... [and that it]
19
shall be governed by the following provisions."
The TEU provides several avenues by which the European
Union may pursue the stated objectives of common foreign and
security policies: (1) systematic cooperation among the member
states in the conduct of foreign policy;2 0 and (2) the gradual
implementation of joint action. 2 1 The Member States commit
themselves to support the Union's foreign and security policy

the TEU the signatories resolve to implement a common foreign and security
policy "thereby reinforcing the European identity in order to promote peace,
security and progress in Europe and in the world." TEU Recital Nine; see
Reflection Group's Report, supranote 5, at 149; Commission Opinion, supra note
5, at 23.
17.
TEU, art. J.1(1). The commitment is stated in obligatory language:
"The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign
and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security concern." Id. This
commitment, obligatory though it may be, is not legally enforceable. See infra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
18.
TEU, art. J.1(2).
19.
Id- art. J.
20.
This cooperation entails systematic coordination of positions and the
taking of common positions. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
21.
TEU, art. J. 1(3).
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"actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual
solidarity,"2 2 and they agree not to take "any action which is
contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its
23
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations."
The TEU adopts, practically unchanged, the obligations of the
Member States and the treaty institutions agreed to six years

earlier in the SEA.

However, the emphasis of the SEA is on

unilateral, though concerted and consistent, positions and
actions among the Member States rather than on a common
policy.24
The SEA certainly acknowledged the incremental
development of a common foreign policy as a goal. 2 s
By
comparison, the TEU deems that a common foreign and security
policy is established by Title V and governed by the provisions of
Article J.
Just what a "common foreign and security policy" means
remains unclear. The TEU contains no definitions or illustrations
of these concepts. In the absence of any definition, the contours
of the common policies must be developed from various other
sources.
Among the Union's stated objectives are "efforts to
assert . . . [its] identity on the international scene in particular
through the implementation of a common foreign and security
policy including the eventual framing of a common defense, which
might in time lead to a common defense." 26 Neither Article B nor
Article J. 1 defines what these terms mean. Obviously, these
policies will cover issues in which the Member States have
common rather than unique interests. Moreover, these common
policies will evolve over time. Article J.l(3) expresses both of
these concepts in providing that the objectives of the common
foreign and security policy are to be pursued "by gradually
implementing... joint action in the areas in which the Member
27
States have important interests in common."

22.

Id. art. J. 1(4).

23.
24.

Id.
For example, under the SEA, consultations were to take place before

the Members decided on their final positions. SEA, art. 30.2. In deciding on their
own positions, the Member States agreed to take into account the positions of the
other Members and to consider the desirability of a common position. SEA, art.
30.2(d). They also agreed to endeavor to avoid any action or position that would
impair the Member States' effectiveness as a cohesive force in international
affairs. SEA, art. 30(2)(d).
25.
The Member States agreed that, in order to increase their capacity for
joint action in foreign policy matters, common principles and objectives would be
developed over time. SEA, art. 30.2(c).
26.
TEU, art. B.
27.
Id. art. J.1(3).
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The experience of the Member States in the EPC process will
also help define the areas of common policy. 2 8 It is also the TEU's
ambition that the common policy stated in the objectives for
Union extend to defense. 2 9 In this respect, the notion of the
common policy is broader than past practice under EPC.
Although economic and political aspects of security issues were
30
able to be considered within EPC, military aspects were not.
The provisions of Title V set out the broad objectives of the

common policies and establish a procedural framework by which
certain specific common positions and joint actions can be agreed
upon. However, the TEU neither facilitates nor provides for a
common policy in the sense of a single document or single
31
decision making body for the Union and the Member States.
Articles J.2 and J.3 of Title V set forth the three means by
which the objectives of the CFSP are to be implemented. 3 2 Article
J.2 contains provisions regarding consultation and common
position and Article J.3 deals with joint actions. In the
consultation procedure, the Member States agree to inform and
consult one another within the Council of Ministers on matters of
foreign policy of general interest. 33 This is done so that the
combined effort of the member states may be exercised as
effectively as possible through concerted and convergent action.
Thus, the aggregate effort of the Member States may be more
effective than unilateral action of the members, even when the
unilateral actions are consistent with each other. This procedure
requires information and consultation, but not much else. It is in

28.
Nanette Neuwahl, Foreignand Security Policy and the Implementation of
the Requirement of "Consistency"under the Treaty on European Union, in LEGAL
ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICT TREATY (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994)
227, 229-31 [hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES] and sources cited therein.
29.
The objective is to implement a common foreign and security policy
"including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time
lead to a common defense." TEU, art. B.
30.
NUTrALL, supra note 15, at 175.

31.
The Commission had proposed to the Intergovernmental Conference in
1992, which produced the TEU, that certain matters of security policy be declared
as vital to the interests of the Union, and that the Council by majority vote be
authorized to formulate common policy with respect to those areas. See 24 BULL.
E. C. (Supp. 2), at 98; Neuwahl, supra note 28, at 229; see also DOMINIC
MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 141 (1997)
[hereinafter MCGOLDRICK] (discussing what is meant by a "common" foreign and
security policy). See generally PHILIP ALLOTT, European ForeignPolicy: After-Life of
an Illusion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 215 (Martti

Koskenniemi ed., 1998) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPEcTs]; TEIJA TIILIKAINEN,
Does Europe Need a Common Identity? A Comment upon the Core Problems of the
CFSP, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPEcTS, id. at 19.
32.
TEU, art. J.2 & J.3.
33.
See id. art. J.2(1).
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language and substance very similar3 4to the obligations imposed
on the Member States under the SEA.

The SEA's political cooperation system was, at base, a system
of consultation and concerted unilateral action, with the aim of
gradually attaining common action. By comparison, the TEU
emphasizes common positions or joint actions. The common
position is the second of the three means of effecting the CFSP.
By virtue of Article J.2(2), the Council of Ministers is authorized,
when it deems it necessary, to define a common position with
respect to a particular foreign policy matter. As contemplated in
Title V, a "common position" is a specific, single, and articulated
position on a matter of international concern to the Union and the
Member States. This common position is promulgated by the
35
Council and is published in the Official Journal of the Union.
After the Council has decided on a common position, the Member
States commit themselves to assuring that their national policies
conform to it;3 6 that is, they will take the actions necessary to
implement the common position. They further agree to coordinate
their actions in international organizations and to uphold the
37
common position in such forums.

Article J.2 thus sets forth two methods of implementing the
CFSP. The first is a process for consultation similar to that of the
SEA. Then, departing from the SEA, Title V provides for the
determination by the Council of a common foreign policy position
for the Union and the Member States, coupled with the obligation
of the Member States to conform their actions to that position.
In reaching a decision about whether to take a common
position, and what that position should be, the Council must act

unanimously.3 8 However, this requirement is not entirely what it
seems to be. In a Declaration incorporated into the Final Act of
the adoption of the TEU, the Member States agreed that, within
CFSP, whenever the Council is to act by unanimity, they would
"to the extent possible" avoid preventing a unanimous vote if a
qualified majority favors the decision.3 9 This Declaration is

34.
SEA, art. 30.2(a).
35.
Common positions are published in the L portion of the Official
Journal, the portion containing legislation and other acts the publication of which
is mandatory.
36.
TEU, art. J.2(2).
37.
Id. art. J.2(3). The Member States agree to support the Union's
external and security policies unreservedly and to refrain from any actions which

are contrary to the interests of the Union or are likely to impair the Union's
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. TEU, art. J. 1(4). The
Single European Act contained a provision similar in nature, but of a more
general nature.
38.
Id. art. J.8(2).

39.

Declaration on Voting in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security

Policy, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 104. The SEA contained a somewhat similar obligation.
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clearly the compromise which might allow the CFSP to function.
Qualified majority voting would obviously provide more flexibility.
But qualified majority voting would have been unacceptable to
many of the Member States; some no doubt would have preferred
complete unanimity. The Declaration is a small acknowledgment
40
by the Member States of their communitarian responsibilities.
Given this "quasi-unanimity" requirement, 41 the consultative
procedure also set forth in Article J.2 remains a viable process in
implementation of the CFSP. Presumably, it is a process to be
used unless the Council determines it should take a common
position or a joint action. As structured in the TEU the common
position procedure lies exclusively within the Council of Ministers,
guided by the principles and general guidelines developed by the
European Council. 42 The impetus for the discussion and
formulation of a common position is within the Council of
Ministers. However, the Member States and the Commission can
suggest to the Council of Ministers that certain matters be the
43
subject of a common position.
The third means of implementation of the CFSP is joint action
by the Union. In this regard a "joint action" means a specific
action or activity undertaken by the Union in response to a
foreign policy concern. Article J.3 sets forth with some precision
the procedure for determination and implementation of a joint
action. The Council of Ministers is to decide, based on general
guidelines from the European Council, whether a matter of

Under it, the Member States agreed to "in as far as possible refrain from impeding
the formation of a consensus and the joint actions which this could produce."
SEA, art. 30.3(c).
40.

This unanimous or "quasi-unanimous" voting requirement is one of

the issues bedeviling CFSP process and is one of the matters some had hoped the
Intergovernmental Conference would reform. See supranotes 5, 8 and infra notes
177-92 and accompanying text for discussion of CFSP expectations.
41.
Despite the requirement of unanimity, during the several years of the
CFSP the Council has determined approximately 35 common positions regarding
almost 20 different issues of a widely varying nature. Common positions have
been taken on issues ranging from Bosnia/Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro,
to arms embargoes on and visa restrictions applicable to officials of Myanmar and
Nigeria because of concerns about the protection of democracy and human rights,
to the EU's objectives in Angola, to efforts achieve an internationally acceptable
solution in East Timor. The monthly Bulletin of the EU contains references to the
common positions, whose test is set forth in the L portion of the Official Journal.
There is criticism, however, of the effectiveness of the Union's record of action
under Title V. See, e.g., Reflection Group's Report, supra note 5, at
146-62;
Commission Opinion, supra note 5, at
23-24; Note, Attempting to Run Before
Learning to Walk- Problems of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, 20
B.C. INTI. & COMP. L. REV. 252 (1997). For a summary of recent CFSP practice,
see Steve Peers, Common Foreign and Security Policy 1995-6, 1996 Y.B. EUR. L.
611.
42.
TEU, arts. J.8(l) & (2).
43
Id. arts. J.8(3).
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In the joint

action procedure, the European Council's role is restated. This
45

role is more specific than it is with respect to common positions.
The Council of Ministers is to decide whether a matter should be
the subject of a joint action on the basis of guidelines furnished
by the European Council. 6 In the text of a joint action decision,
the Council of Ministers refers to the guidelines regarding the
matter specifically provided by the European Council. 4 7 Thus,
the initiative for joint actions rests more with the European
Council. While the Council of Ministers is to decide whether a
matter is to be the subject of a joint action, it does so only after
guidelines have been provided by the European Council.
Assuming a decision to take joint action, the Council of Ministers
shall determine the terms of the action, its scope and objectives,
48
the means of implementation and, if necessary, its duration.
The process of voting on joint actions is confusing. When the
Council of Ministers adopts a joint action, or at any stage
thereafter, the Council may determine which matters should be
voted upon by a qualified majority. 4 9 Thus, the initial decision as
to whether a joint action should be undertaken requires the same
"quasi-unanimity" as the common position. 5 0
However, the
Council of Ministers may then decide that some of the more

44.
Id. art. J.3(1). Matters with defense implications are not to be dealt
with through joint action. TEU, art. J.4(3). Presumably the cooperation and
common position procedures of Article J.2 are to be used for such matters.
45.
The European Council is not specifically assigned a role in the
common position procedure. Its role in that procedure is derivative from its
general role as stated in Article J.8(1) to define the principles and guidelines for
the common foreign and security policies.
46.
TEU, art. J. 3(1).
See, e.g., Council Decision 96/688/CFSP of 22 November 1996
47.

Concerning Measures Protecting Against the Effect of the

Extra-Territorial

Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based
Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L309) 7; Council Decision
96/442/CFSP of 15 July 1996 On the Nomination of a Special Envoy of the
European Union in the City of Mostar, 1996 O.J. (L185) 2. The texts of Council
decisions adopting common positions do not generally contain any reference to
European Council guidelines. See, e.g., Council Decision 96/635/CFSP of 28
October 1996 On Burma/Myanmar, 1996 O.J. (L287) 1.
48.
TEU, art. J.3(1).
49.
Id. art. J.3(2).
50.
During the several years of the CFSP the Council has undertaken over
35 joint actions regarding about 13 widely differing situations. These actions
range from humanitarian aid to Bosnia/Herzegovina, to the administration of

Mostar, to measures designed to counter the extraterritorial effect of third party
legislation (specifically, the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act of 1996
and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 in the United States, see infranotes
59-60 and accompanying text). Many of the joint actions taken are simply
extensions of previously agreed upon actions. The monthly Bulletin of the EU

contains references to the joint actions, whose text is set forth in the L portion of
the Official Journal.
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specific decisions can be taken by a qualified majority. All
decisions will require unanimity, except those more specific
decisions which the Council of Ministers unanimously agrees
shall be made by a qualified majority. l' Once the Council decides
upon a joint action, that
action
52
terminated by the Council.

stands until modified

or

. The specific obligations of the Member States regarding the
joint action are twofold. First, the Member States are bound by
the joint action in the positions they take and in the conduct of
their own international relations.5 3 This obligation means that
the Member States must tailor their own foreign policy to the joint
action. Generally, the joint action, in contrast to the common
position, does not require implementing action by the Member
States. In fact, the joint action is designed to take the place of
unilateral Member State action. But if a Member State does act
with respect to the matter, it would be obliged to act consistently
with a joint action. Taking a unilateral position inconsistent with
the joint action would seem to be a breach of a Member State's
obligation.
The notion that the joint action is to stand in lieu of Member
State action is reinforced by the second of the Member States'
obligations.
Whenever a Member State proposes to take a
national position or action pursuant to the joint action, that state
must provide timely information to the Council so that the
Council may consider the proposal prior to action.5 4 The foreign
policy processes of the Member States are thus constrained by the
joint action. However, the ability of the Member States to act
individually in emergency situations when there has been a
change in circumstances is preserved. In such a situation, a
Member State can essentially act on behalf of the Union by taking
ss
measures consistent with the objective of the joint action.
There is no prescribed form that joint actions must take; they
are, of course, tailored to the situation. Most are taken solely by
the EU and the Council and are funded on an ad hoc basis from
the EU's general budget. Examples of this type include the
51.
TEU, arts. J.3(2) & 8(2). The qualified majority necessary for adoption
is the more strenuous one applicable when the vote is on a measure which is not

brought forward by the Commission. After the enlargement to 15 countries, 62
out of the 87 votes in the Council are required for adoption of such matters and
the affirmative votes must be from at least 10 of the 15 Member States. E. C.
Treaty, as amended, Article 148. See infra notes 177-78.
52.
Id. art. J.3(3). Many of the actions contain a termination date; they
expire by their terms unless extended by a subsequent unanimous agreement to
joint action.
53.
Id. art. J.3(4).
54.
Id. art. J.3(5).
55.
Id. art. J.3(6). However, the Member State concerned must immediately
inform the Council of such measures.
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dispatch of a team of election observers for the 1993
parliamentary elections in Russia 56 and the establishment and
funding of an administrator of the city of Mostar.5 7 In other,
although less common, instances the joint action envisions action
by the European Union institutions and the Member States. For
s8
example, in November 1996 the Council adopted a regulation
retaliating against the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act 5 9 and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,6 0 both of which had
recently been enacted in the United States. On the same day that
the Council adopted the regulation, it also adopted a joint action
supplementing the regulation. 6 1 This joint action requires the
Member States to take such measures as they deem necessary to
protect the interests of their citizens from the consequences of
these U.S. statutes, to the extent that such interests are not
protected by the regulation. These two measures were drafted
and adopted in tandem as a coordinated and plenary response to
the U.S. legislation. The regulation is part of EC law to be
implemented by the Commission and is subject to review and
application by the Court of Justice. By comparison, the joint
action within CFSP is to be implemented by the Member States
and is not subject to review by the Court.
B. Roles of the Institutions
The various institutions of the EU are involved in the CFSP,
except the Court of Justice. The Council of Ministers and its
mirror, the European Council, have the dominant roles, but the
Commission has a significant, though lesser role. The Parliament

56.
Council Decision 93/604/CFSP of 8 November 1993 Concerning the
Dispatch of a Team of Observers for the Parliamentary Elections in the Russian
Federation, 1993 O.J. (L 286) 3.
57.
Council Decision 95/517/CFSP of 4 December 1995 On Continued
Support for European Union Administration of the Town of Mostar, 1995 O.J. (L
298) 4; Council Decision 95/552/CFSP of 19 December 1995 On Continued
Support for European Union Administration of the Town of Mostar, 1995 O.J. (L
313) 1.
58.
Commission Regulation 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 Protecting
Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a
Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L
309) 1.
59.
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified in various sections of 22 U.S.C.
6023, et seq.)

60.

Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.

1541 (1996) (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
61.
Joint Action 96/668/CFSP of 22 November 1996 Concerning
Measures Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of
Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting

Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 7.
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has a role, although a relatively modest one. Parliament is to be
consulted on the main aspect of the foreign and security policy
matters by the Presidency of the Council and it shall assure that
Parliament's views are taken into account. 62 Parliament also has
the right to ask questions and make recommendations. The
Presidency and the Commission are to keep Parliament regularly
informed of the development of foreign and security policies and
Parliament is to hold an annual debate on the process made
toward implementation of the CFSP. 63 Indeed, Parliament often
64
expresses its opinion regarding foreign and security matters.
However, while Title V expressly gives the Member States and the
Commission the right to refer questions and proposals regarding
the common foreign and security policy to the Council,6 5 no
66
comparable right is accorded to the Parliament.

In a sense, the role of the Commission in foreign policy
matters is de-emphasized in the TEU. It is not so much that its
involvement is diminished; rather, the TEU heightens the role of
other institutions. This is an inevitable consequence of the
intergovernmental character of Title V and the CFSP. Certainly,
the Commission is to be intimately involved in the CSFP. Title V
provides that it should be fully associated with the work carried
out in the common foreign and security policy field.6 7 However,
there is no delineation as to what such full association entails. In
the statement of a common position the Council sometimes notes
that the Commission will direct its actions toward achieving the
objectives of the common position through appropriate
Community measures.6 8 The Commission also has a separate role

62.

TEU, art. J.7.

63.
Id.
See, e.g., 1996 O.J.(C 78) 15 Parliament's recommendations regarding
64.
an early settlement of the dispute on the future of Kosovo and the financing of the
reconstructions of Yugoslavia.
TEU, art. J.8(3).
65.
66.
The AT significantly strengthens the position of the Parliament in many
respects. In particular, the co-decision lawmaking process, which gives the
Parliament a role in the lawmaldng process almost equal to that of the Council,
see generally MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 33, is extended to many additional
areas. See generally AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 179 (outlining

new provisions related to the Parliament); Manin, supra note 3, at 11-15
(summarizing changes to Parliament). However, the Parliament's role in the CFSP
as delineated in the TEU is virtually unchanged by the AT. It does have an
indirect role through its participation in the budgeting for CFSP matters. See
infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.

67.
68.

TEU, art. J.9.
See, e.g., Common Position 94/779/CFSP of 28 November 1994 On

the Objectives and Priorities of the European Union towards Ukraine, 1994 O.J.
(L 313) 1 ("The Council Notes that the Commission will direct its action towards
achieving the objectives and priorities of this common position by appropriate
Community measures.").
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69
in CFSP through its participation in the European Council.

More specifically, the Commission is to be fully associated with
the Presidency of the Council in the representation of the Union

in common foreign and security policy matters and in the
implementation of these matters. 70
Member States, the Commission's
and to international conferences,
and agencies shall cooperate to

The diplomatic missions of the
delegations in third countries
and international conferences
ensure compliance with the

71
common positions adopted by the Council.

Article 30(5) of the SEA, each within its sphere of
competence, charges both the Presidency of the Council and the
Commission with ensuring the consistency of the external policies
of the EC and those of the EPC. Also, the Commission is to be
fully associated with the EPC process. 7 2 This latter provision was
maintained in the TEU. 73 However, the former responsibility to
assure competency is replaced in the TEU by the more specific
provisions. But these specific responsibilities and prerogatives of
the Commission are different from, and certainly not paramount
to, those assigned to it which involve the European Community.
In the first pillar of the TEU, the Commission is charged with
enforcing Community law and ensuring that the provisions of the
EC Treaty and measures taken by the institutions pursuant to
the Treaty are applied. 74
By the terms of Title V, the CFSP is under the overall control
of the Council of Ministers and the European Council. Although
the European Council is mentioned in the SEA, 75 its role has

never been well-defined.

As stated in the TEU, the European

Council is comprised of the heads of the government of the
Member States, and the President of the Commission, assisted by
the foreign ministers of the Member States and a member of the
Commission. The European Council is to meet at least twice a
year under the chair of the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers. 76 Within the CFSP, the European Council is to define
general principles and guidelines for the common foreign and
security policy 77 and to provide general guidelines for any matter
subject to a joint action. 7 8 The Council of Ministers, however, is

69.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
70.
TEU, art. J.5(1), (2) & (3).
71.
Id. art. J.6.
72.
SEA, art. 30(3)(b).
73.
TEU, art. J.9.
74.
E.C. Treaty, as amended, art. 155.
75.
SEA, art. 2.
76.
TEU, art. D.2. See MATHJSEN, supra note 9, at 62. This is the same
composition as was provided in the SEA. SEA, art. 2.
77.
Id. art. J.8(1).
78.
Id. art. J.3(1).
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charged with making the decisions necessary for the definition
and implementation of these common policies on the basis of the
general guidelines adopted by the European Council. 7 9 As
previously noted, the Council of Ministers specifically defines and
implements the foreign and security policy through the adoption
and implementation of common positions and joint actions. 80 It
is also charged with ensuring the consistency and effectiveness of
81
the Union's action.
The Council of Ministers is also charged with assuring that
Member States comply with the commitments they have
undertaken to support Union policy and not to engage in action
contrary to the Union's.8 2 There is no express charge to the
Council regarding enforcement of a Member State's specific
obligations with respect to a common position or a joint action.8 3
Presumably, however, a Member State's failure to conform its
national policies to a common position, its failure to implement a
joint action, or its taking a foreign policy position inconsistent
with a joint action8 4 all would constitute a breach of the more
general obligation to support the Union's policies. The Council is
expressly charged with enforcing this more general commitment.
Because CFSP is outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice,8 5 a judicial action by the Council against a recalcitrant
Member to enforce compliance is not possible. The enforcement
tool available to the Council in this regard is political
persuasion.

86

Finally, the Council, through the Presidency, is charged with
representation of the Union in CFSP matters and is responsible
for expressing the Union's position.8 7 The Presidency is assisted
in these responsibilities by the immediate past and the next
Member State to hold the rotating office, the so called "troika."88

79.

Id. art. J.3(1) & J.8(2).

80.
Id. art. J.2(2) & J.3(1).
81.
Id. art. J.8(2).
82.
Id. art. J.1(4).
83.
See supranotes 22-23 and 54-55 and accompanying text.
84.
TEU, art. J.2(2) & J.3(4).
85.
Id. art. L. This is not a change from the past. As structured in the
SEA, the Court had no jurisdiction over the EPC. SEA, art. 31.
86.
The possibility has been raised that inasmuch as the TEU is a treaty, it
is governed by principles of international law, and an action to enforce CFSP
obligations might therefore be brought before the International Court of Justice.
See M. R. Eaton, Common Foreign and Security Policy, in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note
28 at 215, 222. Since the signatories to the TEU specifically provided in that
international agreement that the CFSP obligations and procedures not be
reviewable by the Court of Justice, it is reasonable to assume that they did not
intend the obligations and procedures to be legally enforceable, as opposed to
being politically binding.
87.
TEU, art. J.5(1), (2).
88.
Id. art. J.5(3).
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The Commission is to be fully associated with the Presidency in
this representation. 8 9 A Political Committee comprised of the
"Political Directors," or senior foreign ministry officials, of the
Member States is also established. 90 This Committee is charged
with monitoring the situation in areas covered by common foreign
or security policies. It contributes to the formulation of these
policies by stating its opinion, either at the request of the Council
or on its own initiative. Working groups of representatives of
Member States reporting to the Political Committee are
responsible for the detailed work of the CFSP. 9 1 The former EPC
Secretariat, which assisted the Presidency under the SEA, was
subsumed into the general secretariat of the Council. 92
The
Political Committee as created by Title V is said to be "without
prejudice to article 151 [of the EC Treaty]." 9 3
Thus, the
COREPER created by Article 151 of the EC Treaty continues its
work of preparing the agendas for the Council and facilitating its
94
work.
The financing of the CFSP effort comes from two possible
sources: the Community's budget or contributions from the
Member States. 95 Administrative expenses are to be charged to
the Community's budget. 96 The Council can determine by the
"quasi-unanimity" rule that operational expenses, usually those
usually arising from a joint action (i.e., the expenses of the

89.
Id. Thus, the representation is by a "troika" of four. Within the
Commission, several directorates are concerned with external relations. These
directorates are responsible for carrying out the Commission's and the EC's
external affairs responsibilities.
An additional directorate, DG1A, was
established in 1993 to manage external affairs. This directorate, among other
tasks, is responsible for carrying out the Commission's role in CFSP. Also,
because of his role as a member of the European Council and a participant in the
Council of Ministers deliberations, the President of the Commission is deeply
involved in foreign affairs matters, in addition to his other responsibilities. See
McGOLDRICK, supra note 31, at 146.
90.
TEU, art. J.8(5). A similar body with roughly the same charge existed
within the SEA's EPC system. SEA, art. 30.
91.

IAN MACLEOD ET AL., THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS

OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES (1996) 422 [hereinafter MACLEOD].
92.
Declaration on Practical Arrangements in the Field of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 104; MCGOLDRICK, supra note 31,
at 146.
93.
TEU, art. J.8(5).
94.
MACLEOD, supra note 91, at 421; MCGOLDRICK, supranote 31, at 146.
COREPER is the acronym for the Committee for Permanent Representatives
(COmite des REpresentants PERmants). Since the Council of Ministers meets
only a few days a month, a more permanent body is necessary to prepare for the
meetings of the Council to follow up on actions taken. COREPER is that body. It
is composed of high level civil servants from each of the Member States. See
MATHIJSEN, supranote 9, at 55-56.
95.
TEU, art. J.11(2).
96.
Id.
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administration of the city of Mostar 9 7 or contributions to the
establishment of the Palestinian police force),9 8 be funded from
the Community's budget or from Member State contributions.9 9
If the former source is selected, the normal Community budgetary
process is applicable.100
C. Problems of Consistency
1. Consistency Among Actors
The three pillars of the Union, or more to the point of this
discussion, the first and the second-the EC and the CFSP-are
maintained and implemented by a single institutional structure,
mainly the Council, Commission, and Parliament of the EC. The
roles of the institutions and the relationship between the
institutions and the Member States vary from pillar to pillar.
Activities taken under the first pillar are subject to different
procedures and have different legal consequences than activities
taken under the second or third pillar. Moreover, it is inevitable
that the same institution may be working on the same general
matter within the context of two or even all three of the pillars,
and conversely that the same matter will be considered in more
than one pillar. International affairs is an area that has this
character.
The Council and the Commission maintain the ongoing task
of carrying out the Union's external relations within the EC and

separately within the CFSP. These institutions may be working
on the same foreign policy matter within both the first and second
pillars.
The allocation of external affairs responsibilities or
competencies between the institutions and the Member States is
an area of European Union law and practice still fraught with
ambiguity and tension.1 0 1 CFSP presents an opportunity for

97.
Council Agreement in Principle, 27 BULL. E.U. (10-1994) 47.
98.
Council Decision 94/276/CFSP of 19 April 1994 In Support of the
Middle East Peace Process, art. 3,1994 O.J. (LI19) 1.
99.
TEU, art. J. 11(2).

100.

Id.

101.
See generally Opinion 1/94, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) of the
EC Treaty, 1994 E.C.R 1-5267 (discussing the competence of the Community to

conclude international agreements dealing with services and protection of
intellectual property on behalf of Member States); Case 22/70, Commission v.
Council 1971 E.C.R. 263 (determining that the Commission's objection to the
Member States' negotiation of the AETR treaty dealing with international road
transport be dismissed); MACLEOD, supra note 91; MCGOLDRICK supra note 31;
Marise Cremona, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union

and the External Relations Powers of the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES,
supra note 28, at 247 [hereinafter Cremona]; ALAN DASHWOOD, Implied External
Competence of the EC, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 31, at 113;
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Union's

external affairs are conducted within the first and second pillar,

often within the third pillar as well. The need for consistency of
action is obvious. But achieving consistency presents serious
challenges. The intergovernmental nature of the second pillar
versus the institutional nature of the first pillar could present the

occasion for inconsistent practice, as could the vagueness and
evolving nature of the external affairs aspects of Union law and
practice.
The notion of consistency is that measures taken
should not conflict with or undercut one another, but should be
compatible and mutually reinforcing.10 2 Some facets of the
challenge of consistency will be treated here.
For a variety of reasons, consistent practice among the
Member States should not be difficult to sustain. This aspect of
consistency is governed by the most extensive set of rules and
processes. The Member States, together with the President of the
Commission, comprise the European Council. 10 3 To the extent
that a particular foreign policy matter is considered within the
European Council, unanimous support for the position would be
required.' 0 4 Because Member States are members of the Council
of Ministers, any specific action will be adopted only after
obtaining unanimity or at least "quasi-unanimity" among the
Member States. 10 If a Member State opposed a particular action,
it could prevent the requisite unanimity. ' 0 6
After a position is adopted, the Member States obligate
themselves to support the policies and positions agreed upon, and
there are specific provisions in Title V which minimize the
Member States' ability or need to act inconsistently with these
positions.' 0 7
Lastly, the Council is granted the authority to
enforce, at least politically, the common positions and joint
actions vis-&-vis the Member States.

Nicholas Emiliou, The Allocation of Competence Between the EC and Member States
in the Sphere of External Relations, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW
31 (Nicholas Emiliou & David O'Keeffe eds., 1996); Koen Lenaerts and Eddy De
Smijter, The European Community's Treaty-Making Competence, 1996 Y.B. EUR. L.

1; Takis Tridimas & Piet Eeckhout, The External Competence of the Community
and the Case Law of the Court of Justice: Principle versus Pragmatism,1994 Y.B.
EUR. L. 143.
102.
Neuwahl, supranote 28, at 235.
103. TEU, art. D.
104. Id. art. J.3(1) & J.8(2). See infra note 179 for a discussion of voting
within the European Council.
105.
See supranote 38-41 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107.
See supranotes 22-23, 36, 38-40, 54-56 and accompanying text. In
addition, Article J.3(7) provides that a Member State having difficulty in
implementing a joint action should refer this difficulty to the Council which will
discuss the matter and seek appropriate solutions. The solution might entail
modification of the terms of the joint action to accommodate the point of difficulty.
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On another level there is a basis for real concern regarding
consistency of action among the Member States. Joint actions
within CFSP generally are single actions undertaken by and on
the behalf of the Union, such as the European Union's
administration of the city of Mostar.1 0 8 In contrast, the common
position is, in a sense, like a directive in the EC legislative

scheme. A common position calls upon the Member States to do
tasks, but it leaves the specific mechanisms for accomplishing
those tasks to national authorities and processes. 0 9 Hence,
there is not one operational order, but fifteen, all presumably
working toward the common objective.
For example, numerous common positions impose embargoes
on the sale of arms and military equipment; some go further by
imposing entry visa restrictions. Such a common position was
1 10
adopted in October 1996 with respect to Burma/Myanmar.
Among other measures, an embargo on sales of arms and military
equipment and on all non-humanitarian aid and development
programs was imposed."' In addition, entry visas for certain
government and military officials and their families were
prohibited and visits by high-ranking officials of the Member
States were suspended. 1 12
Implementation of the measures set forth in this common
position requires fifteen separate national actions.
As with
directives, the precise form and timetable for implementation of
these national actions may vary. Because this common position
is taken within CFSP, it is not justiciable. 1 13 The Council or other
Member States could not bring an action against a recalcitrant
Member to force compliance. Compliance is left to the persuasion
of the Council. 114
The Council is charged with ensuring consistency in defining
and implementing the common policies. 115 It must assure that
the CFSP positions and actions are consistent with one
another. 1 16
Because of the intergovernmental nature of the
second pillar, the Commission is given no charge in this respect

108. See supranote 97.
109. TEU, art. J.2(2).
110. Common Position 96/635/CFSP of 28 October 1996 On
Burma/Myanmar, 1996 O.J. (L 287) 1.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. TEU, art. L.
114. Since the common position required unanimity there should be less of

an issue of non-compliance. But in view of the "quasi-unanimity" rule, one or
more Members may be less committed to the common position and might be slow
to comply, or comply ineffectually. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying
text.
115. TEU, art. J.8(2).
116. Id.

1998]

THE E.U.'S COMMON FOREIGNAND SECURITY POLICY

891

within Title V. However, Article C of the TEU charges both the
Council and the Commission with assuring consistency of
external activities within their respective spheres.1 1 7 Since the
Commission has no responsibility or power to assure consistency
under the second pillar, its responsibility as stated in Article C
must be to assure that all of the operations and activities for
which it does have responsibility under the treaties are carried
out consistently, both with one another and with the objectives of
CFSP. This raises the troublesome question of which part of the
Union's overall activity is paramount: the EC and its acquis or
the CFSP." 8 Article C's charge imposes a significant burden on
the Commission. It is charged with assuring consistency of
activity within the first and second pillars. Yet it has no direct
role in determining the activities in the second pillar, other than
the President of the Commission's participation in the European
Council. In a sense, the Commission is placed in a reactive

rather than a proactive role.

It is charged with assuring

consistency, but it does not have the power to initiate action

within the second pillar to help achieve this goal.
Foreign policy matters are dealt with in both the first and
second pillars, although the actions taken with respect to them
under the first pillar are subject to quite different rules and
review processes than those which might apply within the second
pillar. Actions taken within the EC system must be grounded in a
proper treaty provision, be adopted and implemented under the
proper procedures, and meet the test of subsidiarity." 9 These
actions are judicially reviewable. 120 None of these requirements,
1 1
except the proper voting majority, apply in the second pillar. '
Consistency of action between the two pillars logically means that
activities undertaken in the second pillar are in part constrained
by the first pillar. Particularly, if Article C dictates that there be
consistency between the pillars, the activity in the second is
constrained by the bounds of lawful action under the first pillar.
This in turn might dilute the efficacy of the Union's overall
approach to a particular issue.
Two recent foreign policy matters illustrate these points.
United States legislation enacted in 1996 imposes economic
sanctions on any person, within or without the United States,
engaged in certain economic activities in Cuba, Iran, and

117.

Id. art. C.

118.

See infra note 140 and accompanying text.

119.
See generally MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at Part One, Chapter Three;
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3td ed. 1994), Parts

I and II.
120.
121.

TEU, art. L.
See supranote 38-41 and accompanying text.
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These statutes were of grave concern within the
Union 123 and the Union reacted, proceeding down parallel tracks.
The Commission drafted and the Council adopted a strong
retaliatory
regulation
through
the
usual
lawmaking
procedures. 124 Within CFSP, a joint action was agreed upon the
day the regulation was adopted. 12 s The regulation is subject to
the normal EC rules, including a proper grounding in a treaty
provision and subsidiarity justification. 12 6 Consistency between
the pillars was neatly achieved in this situation.
The
Commission's responsibilities extended no further than is usual
in EC matters. The joint action supplemented the regulation by
directing the Member States to take such measures as they
deemed necessary to protect persons within their territories from
Libya. 122

the consequences of the statutes to the extent that these interests
7
2
were not protected by the regulation.'

122. Among other provisions, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996 (the Helms-Burton Act), supra note 59: strengthens the
economic and financial embargo against Cuba by applying its provisions to
foreign firms owned or controlled by "US persons" (Title I); makes any person, US
citizen or not, "trafficking" in property confiscated by the Cuban government
liable to any US national owing the claim to such property; and excludes from the
United States officers and controlling shareholders of companies "trafficking" in
such property and their families (Title Mf). The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
.1996, supranote 60, authorizes the President to impose a range of sanctions on
any person, US or foreign citizen, who has invested more than a specified sum in
Iran or Libya.
123. See, e.g., Ian Black, Sanctions Bill Likely to Infuriate EU Row: Looms
Over New US Move to Target "Pariah"Regimes, GUARDIAN, July 18, 1996, at 13
(outlining European, especially British, concerns with the bills); Tom Rhodes,
Clinton Bows to Protest on Cuba Trading, TIMES of London,' July 17, 1996, at 1
(describing President Clinton's compromise to avoid a trade war with Europe);
John Palmer & Jonathan Freedland, Europe Poisedfor Trade Clash with US over
Cuba, GUARDIAN, July 16, 1996, at 3 (discussing possible EU retaliatory legislation
that meets the threat of U.S. sanctions regarding trade with Cuba).
124. Council Regulation (EC) 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 Protecting
Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a
Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L
309) 1. Among other provisions, the regulation prohibits persons from complying
directly or through a subsidiary with any requirement or prohibition of the "laws
specified in the Annex," id. art. 5, and creates a cause of action in favor of any
person damaged by application of the laws specified in the Annex. Id. art. 6.
125. Joint Action 96/668/CFSP of 22 November 1996 Protecting Against
the Effects of Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third
Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 7.
This joint action calls upon the Member States to take such measures as they
deem necessary to protect the interests of persons in their territories from the

effects of the U.S. legislation, to the extent such interests are not protected by the
Regulation. See also Peers, supra note 41, at 641 (discussing union efforts to
deter the United States from applying the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996).
126. See supranote 118.
127. See supranote 125.
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Another example occurred in 1994, when a common position
was adopted defining the Union's objectives and priorities
regarding the Ukraine. 128 In this common position the Member
States undertook to conform their policies to further the stated
objectives and the Council noted that the Commission would
direct its action toward achieving the States' objectives and
priorities. 12 9 In this situation, the achievement of the overall
CFSP objective is partly constrained by the bounds of lawful
action under the first pillar because of the Commission's
involvement.
2. Challenges Arising from the Authorized Spheres of CFSP
Action
As stated in Article J. 1, the Union and the Member States
agreed to implement a common foreign and security policy
covering "all areas of foreign and security policy"' 3 0 and such
policy is governed by the provisions of Title V.' 3 1 Given the non32
justifiability of the CFSP, both as to substance and process,1
this sweeping language of Article J. 1 is doubly significant. Read
literally, it appears to cover all matters of a foreign or security
policy nature. The only constraints in Article J. 1 are the fact that
the matters must be of common concern to several Member
States, and that there be at least "quasi-unanimous" support for
action with respect to them.13 3
Given the uncertainties
surrounding external affairs within the EC Treaty and acquisincluding the issues of allocation of competencies between the
Member States and institutions,' 3 4 as well as the questions of

proper treaty basis authorizing a particular action and
subsidiarity-Article J.1 might be viewed as an extraordinary
grant. All of the procedural niceties, along with possibility of
judicial review, could be avoided by taking action to deal with any
foreign policy or security policy situation under the second pillar
rather than under the first.
However, Title V and Article J. 1 are not "writ so large."
Article M of the TEU provides that the EC Treaty as amended
shall not be affected by certain portions of the TEU, including

128. Common Position 94/779/CFSP of 28 November 1994 On the
Objectives and Priorities of the European Union Towards Ukraine, 1994 O.J. (L
313)1.
129. Id.
130. TEU, art. J.I(1).
131. Id. art. J.
132. Id. art. L.
133. Id. arts. J.1(3), J.8(2).
134. See supra note 101.
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Title V. 13 5 Article M is within the competence of the Court of
Justice. 136 Thus, questions with respect to the line between the
EC Treaty and CFSP are justiciable. 13 7 Because both the EC
system and the CFSP are dynamic and evolving, the vague line
drawn by Article M between the EC system and CFSP will be a
source of continuing uncertainty.
Member States or the
Commission could institute an action before the Court of Justice
pursuant to Article 173 of the EC Treaty, 138 seeking to annul a
Council CFSP decision, on the grounds that the decision is
inconsistent with or undermines the EC Treaty.
The broad language of Article J. 1, providing that all foreign
and security matters are subject to defnition and implementation
within CFSP notwithstanding, the EC Treaty has allocated certain
activities and responsibilities with external affairs aspects to the
Community institutions. This apparent inconsistency raises the
question of whether the EC Treaty circumscribes legitimate CFSP
action or whether the EC Treaty and acquis are modified by CFSP
decisions. The language of Article M appears to place the EC
Treaty in the dominant position.

If, as Article M provides, Title V is not to affect the EC Treaty,
and by extension all of the acquis, then Title V should not impinge
on or subsume the external affairs undertaken within the EC
Treaty and acquis. The logic of this notion certainly extends to
the past. Activities or agreements in place under the EC system
should not be subject to an action under the CFSP. 13 9 In the
WTO case, 14 ° the Court of Justice determined that by virtue of
Article 113 of the EC Treaty the Community had exclusive
competence as against the Member States to negotiate and
represent the Community and the Member States in the
negotiation of the Multilateral Agreements Covering the Trade in
Goods as part of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. It would seem
inappropriate for the Member States through CFSP to adopt a
common position or joint action regarding issues involving the
Multilateral Agreements.
Moreover, there seems to be little

135.

TEU, art. M provides:

Subject to the provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community with a view to establishing the European Economic
Community... and to these final provisions, nothing in this Treaty shall
affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them.
136. As stated in Article L of the TEU, the Court of Justice's jurisdiction
includes Articles L through S of the TEU. TEU, art. L(c).
137. Id.
138. E.C. Treaty, as amended, art. 173.
139. See Cremona, supra note 101, at 254.
140. Opinion 1/94, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) of the E.C. Treaty,
1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, 5286-87.

1998]

THEE.U.'S COMMON FOREIGNAND SECURITY POLICY

895

reason to distinguish areas in which the Community has acted in
the past from areas in which future action is possible. The
principle of Article M should mean that the CFSP ought not
intrude into areas of exclusive Community competence,
regardless of whether the Community had previously acted with
respect to a particular issue.
In areas of shared competence the resolution is less clear. It
would seem that even in shared areas CFSP should not be used to
detract from agreements previously negotiated by the Community.
But as to future activities this determination is less certain. In
the WTO case, the Commission argued that the exclusive
competence of the Community should extend to the two other
major sets of agreements covered by the Uruguay Round-the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GAS) and the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). 14 1
The Court held that these latter two sets of
agreements did not fall entirely within Article 113 of the EC
Treaty, but were instead part of the shared competency between
42
the Community and the Member States.1
Article M presumably would allow a common position or a
joint action under CFSP in these two areas. Curiously, the AT
would add a new Article 113(5) to the EC Treaty which would
allow the Commission to negotiate agreements relating to services
and intellectual property, but only if the Council unanimously
acts on the proposal from the Commission requesting such an
extension of authority. 14 Obviously, if such unanimous approval
were granted, the common position or joint action with respect to

such types of agreements should not be taken within CFSP.

If

such a grant of authority is not given, presumably activity by
"quasi-unanimity" within CFSP would be possible.
Also, under the AT, large areas of the European Union's
asylum and immigration policies would be brought within the EC
sphere. 144 Clearly, upon ratification, the CFSP should not be
permitted to prevent common positions or joint actions in areas
covered by those new provisions of the EC Treaty.

141. Id. at5303-05, 5313-15.
142. Id. at 5417, 5419.
143. AT, art. 2(20), amending Article 113 by adding new paragraph (5).
Normally, under Article 113, the Commission's authority to negotiate is granted
on the basis of a qualified majority approval from the Council. E.C. Treaty, Article
113(4).
144. Id. art. 2(15) (adding a new Title lIa to the E.C. Treaty dealing with

visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of
persons).
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3. Challenges Arising from the EC Treaty and Law
Two other, and related, doctrines allow for the evolution of
Community competence.
The first is the doctrine of implied
powers. Article 235 of the EC Treaty gives the Community the
implied power, upon the unanimous approval of the Council, to
take measures necessary for the attainment of the objectives of
the EC Treaty when the Treaty has not provided for the necessary
power. 145 Separately, the Court of Justice held more that twentyfive years ago in the E.R.T.A. case" 4 6 that the Community's treaty
or agreement-making powers extended to all areas of activities
listed in Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome.14 7 Moreover, the Court
stated that the Community's authority to enter into international
agreements can be implied from the whole scheme of the EC
Treaty, not just from its substantive provisions. 148
The doctrine of "parallelism" in EC law states that as the
Community's internal competence grows or changes-either
through additions to areas of expressly exclusive competence, use
of the implied power under Article 235 of the EC Treaty, or by
activity in areas of shared competence-its external competence
changes correspondingly. 14 9 In E.R.T.A., the Court noted that
"the system of internal Community measures may not be
50
separated from that of external relations."'
These are settled doctrines of EC law. Article M's injunction
that the second pillar not affect the EC Treaty logically extends to
these settled doctrines. Article M ought not be interpreted to
detract from the accretion in Community competence through the
doctrines of implied powers or "parallelism." Such accretion,
however, will be at the expense of the CFSP. Once the EC has
acted on a matter pursuant to these doctrines, a subsequent
CFSP action with respect to that matter would seem
inappropriate.
On the other hand, little would be gained if

145. MATHIJSEN, supranote 9, at 57.
146. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council 1971 E.C.R. 263.
147. Id. at 274. The list of activities in Article 3 of the E.C. Treaty which are
to be pursued by the Community or the Union has been expanded by the SEA,
the TEU, and the AT.
148. Id. at 274; see dlso Cases 3,4,6/76 Kramer [1976] E.C.R. 1-1279. See
generally Dashwood, supra note 101 (discussing the EC's ability to enter into
international commitments and to function as a subject of international law, even
in instances not expressly authorized by the Treaty).
149. See MACLEOD, supra note 91, at 47-48 (describing the doctrine of
parallelism).
150. Id. at 49 (citing Case 22/70, supra note 146); see also Opinion 2/91
(Re. ILO Convention 170) 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061 (describing the implied competence
of the Community as flowing from the Treaty's provision); MACLEOD, supra note
91, at 47-8 (discussing the parallelism between the Community's internal and
external powers).
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actions in CFSP were forestalled because the area might in the
future be deemed by the Court of Justice of be part of the EC's
competence. If such a decision were made, Article M would
simply dictate that the common position or joint action be
terminated in favor of EC action under the first pillar. Or, as was
neatly done in the 1996 economic sanctions setting,' 5 1 the CFSP
action could be tailored to supplement the EC action.
There is another area of confusing overlap between the first
and the second pillars, one by which the CFSP may broaden the
scope of legitimate EC activity. Prior to the adoption of the TEU
there had been concern over the legitimacy of Community-based
economic sanctions. It was unclear whether Article 113 of the EC
Treaty (the article stating the Community's competence with
respect to the commercial policy) provided a sufficient basis for
economic sanctions. 15 2 The TEU, in part, responded to this
uncertainty by adding Article 228(a) to the EC Treaty.15 3 This
Article provides that when a common position or a joint action
adopted in the second pillar calls upon the Community to impose
economic sanctions, the "Council shall take the necessary urgent
action." 15 4 This provision is a separate treaty basis of authority
for the imposition of economic sanctions. When it is used, the
sanctions do not need to be grounded in Article 113 of the EC
This provision folds the
Treaty or other authorizing law.' s s
sanctions requested in a CFSP decision into the EC order to be
implemented by a regulation or a directive.' 5 6 However, because

151. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (discussing the US
sanctions for dealing with "pariah" nations and the corresponding European
retaliatory measures).
152. See MACLEOD, supra note 91, at 352-53 (describing the status of
Article 113 before the TEU); Pieter Jan Kuyper, Community Sanctions against
Argentina: Lawfulness under Community and International Law, in ESSAYS IN
EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 141 (David OKeeffe & Henery G. Schermers eds.,

1982).

153.
154.

See MACLEOD, supra note 91, at 354-57.
E. C. Treaty, Article 228(a) provides:

Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted
according to the provision of the Treaty of European Union relating to the
common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to
interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one
or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent
measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission.
See generally MACLEOD,

supra note 91, at 352-66 (discussing Community

sanctions).
155. MAcLEOD, supra note 91, at 356.
156. These measures would most likely be regulations because of the direct
applicability doctrine. Article 228(a) provides that the "Council shall take the
necessary urgent measures."

They are adopted by a qualified majority acting on

a recommendation from the Commission. But the Parliament apparently has no
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Article 228(a) is a separate, explicit authorization, the Community
The subsidiary
order may be expanded through its use.
justification for them ought to apply, as it does to other EC
legislation or action. But such justification can likely be easily
met, as it was in the case of the 1996 sanctions.
4. Practice
The practice to date shows little intrusion by CFSP into
Community activity, in either substantive matters or specific
implementing measures. The matters dealt with to date are
generally of the type that would have been considered within the
EPC system and are therefore outside the normal Community
competence. The actions taken regarding the former Yugoslavia,
election monitoring in Russia, support for the Middle East peace
process, concerns for stability, democratic values and human
rights in Nigeria, Afghanistan and Myanmar, are not matters
relating .to commercial policy, fishing, agriculture or the
environment-those areas of Community concern. 157
The previously discussed European Union reaction to the
U.S. sanction legislation is the foreign policy issue which could
have directly raised the conflict between the EC system and
CFSP. This foreign policy issue, the extra-territorial imposition of
economic sanctions by the United States, is commercial in
character. And the European Union's response was to enact both
Community legislation (regulation) under the first pillar and a
joint action under the second pillar.15 8 The foreign policy matter
certainly comes within the Community's competence, as
witnessed by the regulation. The regulation does not literally
impose economic sanctions against the United States or its
citizens, and consequently it was adopted under the normal lawmaking process rather than under Article 228(a) of the EC Treaty.
The response within CFSP was by a joint action, which by its
terms was deferential to the Community action.
It was
supplemental in nature, calling for protective measures to be
applied to the extent protection was not afforded by the
regulation.' 5 9 Both the Community and the CFSP were acting
within their respective spheres. Article M was not breached, and
the Union effected a plenary response to the legislation.

involvement. MACLEOD, supra note 91, at 357. Article 228(a) is limited by its
terms. It only authorizes economic sanctions imposed by the EC pursuant to a
joint action or common position. It does not clarify the legal uncertainty
surrounding any other economic sanction action taken by the EC.
157. See supranotes 97, 98, 110.
158. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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III. THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM
A. Structure and Procedures
The conclusions of the Intergovernmental Conference with
respect to the CFSP, and as expressed in the AT, are procedural
and to some extent structural. The AT starts fresh in this respect.
It replaces all of the former Title V with a new Title V.16 0 Thus,
anything not restated in the new Title V is eliminated. But the
16 1
new Title V restates almost all of the old and adds very little.
CFSP remains the procedural framework it was under the TEU.
No progress was made on the definition of a common foreign or
security policy.
If anything, the AT takes a step backwards in stating the
overall aim of the CFSP. The TEU boldly asserted that a common
foreign and security policy was established by its terms, although
there was in fact no statement of any policy. The AT more
modestly-and more realistically-states that "the Union shall
16 2
define and establish a common foreign and security policy."
This rephrasing is an acknowledgment of the organic nature of
the CFSP, and it is a concession to the reality that policies will

have to develop over time.
Article J.1 of the TEU states that "[tihe Union and the
Member States shall define and implement . . . ." the common
policies. As restated in the AT, the reference to the Member
States is dropped and the sentence reads "the Union shall define
and implement. . . ." In one sense this is not a change because
the Union, though not a legal personality, is thought to include
the Community institutions, the Member States, and the
citizenry. Elimination of the reference does not diminish the role
of the Members. In fact, the Member States individually are in a
3
stronger position under the AT than they were under the TEU.16
But inclusion of the reference to the Member States in the TEU
emphasized the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP. Deletion
of the reference in the AT emphasizes the integration of the
Member States into the Union. They are separate states, yet part
of the Union.

160. AT, art. 1(10), replacing Title V.
161.
Title V in the AT consists of eighteen subsections. Most of the changes
are organizational, not substantive, in nature. Id.
162.
Id. art. J.1(1). The bold introductory sentence to Title V of the TEU

stating that the "common foreign and security policy is hereby established which
shall be governed by the following provisions" of Article J of the TEU is simply
deleted. In the AT version of Title V there is no introductory statement. Title V,
Article J simply begins with Article J.1 "[tihe Union shall define and
implement... ."

163.

See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
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The AT also adds an additional objective to the CFSP: the
safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the Union in conformity
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.1 6 4 Again,
the reference is only to the Union. In context, this reference to
territory of the Union, rather than to that of the Member States,
seems to be a rather presumptuous assertion.
The means by which the CFSP is to be pursued is also
modified in the AT. Understandably, given the evolution of the
processes, the consultation and coordination provisions which
were carried over into the TEU from the EPC have been deemphasized. As recast, Article J.2 provides that the objectives of
the CFSP shall be pursued by five means: (1) defining the
principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and
security policy; (2) deciding on common strategies; (3) adopting
common positions; (4) adopting joint actions; 165 and (5)
strengthening systematic cooperation among the Member States
in the conduct of policy. 166
Articulation of the principles and guidelines for the common
policies has thus become one of the means by which the CFSP
pursues its objectives. This certainly makes sense and fills a gap
that existed in the TEU. 167 But its falls far short of the aim that
the Intergovernmental Conference should provide some content to
the policy, rather than simply provide the procedural
framework.168 In fact, the effort at definition has been removed
from the pressure and crucible of the Intergovernmental
Conference and set as an ongoing project.. However, this project
169
is without specific impetus or timetable.

164.
AT, art. J.1.
165.
The terms "common position" and "joint action" have been defined.
Under the AT, a "joint action" addresses "specific situations where operational
action by the Union is deemed required," AT, art. J.4(1), and a "common position"
"defime[s] [t]he approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographic or
thematic nature." Id. art. J.5.
166.
Id. art. J.2.
167.
Effectively the role assigned to the European Council in the TEU to

provide general guidelines and more specific guidelines for joint actions TEU arts.
J.8(1), J.3(1) was a means by which the CFSP was articulated and implemented.
But this role was not stated among the TEU's means of effecting the CFSP, TEU
arts. J.2, J.3.
168. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text; Commentary: Foreign
Policy or Troupe L'Oeili, in AT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 124
(supporting a stronger CFSP).
169. It has been noted that the TEU was negotiated against the backdrop of
the Gulf War whereas the AT was negotiated in an era in which domestic
pressures were paramount. Id. The effort at definition of common policy might
have been easier in 1992 at the time the TEU was negotiated than during the
1996 IGC, or than it will be in the future. In 1995 three "neutral" states joined
the Union, Austria, Finland and Sweden, adding three new voices to the previous
twelve. Future enlargements will add more disparate views.
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Under the AT, the CFSP is also to be pursued using the
"common strategy."' 70 The common strategy is a decision or
position more specific than the general guidelines, but not as
tactical as the common position or joint action. This device did
not exist as such under the TEU. The provisions regarding
common positions and joint actions-including the Member
States' obligations with respect to them-are not substantially
changed. 17 ' The voting on these matters, however, has become
even more cumbersome than it was under the TEU's "quasiunanimity" procedure. At first glance, one might conclude that
the CFSP process will be greatly facilitated because qualified
majority voting has been introduced. However, what the AT has
given with one hand it has taken back with the other. In the final
analysis unanimity will still be required.
Article J. 13 sets out two separate procedures for voting
within CFSP and it indicates the matters to be voted on under
each procedure. Article J. 13(2) contains the procedure for voting
on joint actions, common positions, decisions concerning
implementation, and decisions based on a common strategy. For
these matters, voting is by a qualified majority.1 72 While this may
appear to be a tremendous step forward, it is not. After Article
J. 13(2) provides for qualified voting, the very next sentence states
that if a Member State declares that for important and stated
reasons of national policy it intends to oppose the measure, a vote
will not be taken. Thus, unanimity is effectively required for
adoption of these measures, as one Member State can block the
taking of a vote. If a vote is not taken, the Council can request,
by a qualified majority vote, that the matter be referred to the
European Council. 173 The only qualification on the objecting

170.
171.

See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
The Member States are to assure that their policies conform to the

common positions. AT, art. J.5. This obligation on the Member States is not only
to assure that their positions not be inconsistent with the common position, but

that they affirmatively implement the common position.
172.

Again it would be the more stringent qualified majority rule from

Article 148(2) of the E.C. Treaty, as these votes are not on proposals from the
Commission.
See supra note 51.
The Commission, consistent with the
intergovernmental character of the CFSP, does not have the right to initiate
proposals. But see infra note 216 and accompanying text. As provided in Article
148(2) of the E.C. Treaty as amended, passage of a measure by qualified majority
voting requires the affirmative vote of 62 of the 87 votes in the Council. The votes
are weighted as follows: Germany, France, Italy, and the UK-10 votes each;
Spain-8 votes; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal-5 votes each;
Austria and Sweden-4 votes each; Denmark, Finland, and Ireland-3 votes each;
and Luxembourg-2 votes.
173. AT, art. J.13(2). This explicit qualified majority with the right to block

procedure means that the Ioannina Agreement is not applicable to voting within
CFSP. Council Decision of 29 March 1994, on the Taking of Decisions by
Qualified Majority by the Council, 1994 O.J. (C 105) 1, as amended by Council

902

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:871

Member's unfettered right to block an action covered by this
section is that it may have to sustain its opposition within the

European Council and withstand persuasive pressure brought by
the other Members. The European Council has the power to
decide that a matter should be pursued nonetheless, but only if it
174
votes to do so unanimously.
As structured in Article J. 13(2), the position of the Member
States with regard to the voting procedures has been
strengthened from that which they .enjoyed under the TEU.
Under the Declaration of Voting within CFSP, which was also part
of the TEU, the Member States were obligated to make an effort to
defer to the group. 175 Each Member obligated itself to avoid, to
the extent possible, preventing a unanimous vote if a qualified
majority existed in favor of adoption.' 76 Article J.13(2) requires

Decision of 1 January 1995, 1995 0. J. (Cl) 1. The Ioannina Agreement is an
attempt to minimize the number of Member States voting against a measure when
voting is by qualified majority, thereby assuring a broader basis for support for
the measure among the Member States. As provided in Article 148 of the E.C.
Treaty, as amended, adoption of a measure by qualified majority requires 62
affirmative votes out of the total of 87 votes. Thus, a measure could be adopted

even though as many as 25 negative votes were cast. The Ioannina Agreement
provides that if Member States holding between 23 and 25 votes in the Council
indicate their intention to oppose adoption of a measure, the Council will do all in
its power to reach a satisfactory solution whereby the measure could be adopted
by at least 65 votes. This solution might entail modification of the proposal in
order to garner the necessary votes. The Agreement also means that in very close
cases, even though there are sufficient votes for adoption, opposing Members can
force further discussion, and perhaps modification, of the proposal.
174. AT, art. J.13(2). The AT requires absolute unanimity for such a vote
within the European Council. Throughout the AT the distinction between the
Council of Ministers and the European Council is maintained.
The term
"European Council" is used when the reference is to that body, and the term
"Council" is used when reference is to the Council of Ministers of the Union.
Article J.13(1) provides that "[d]ecisions under this Title shall be taken by the
Council acting unanimously." The reference there is to decisions of the "Council,"
thus it is a reference to actions of the Council of Ministers. Article J. 13(1) goes on
to provide for the constructive abstention from "Council" decisions. See infra note
182 and accompanying text. Separately, Article J.13(2) provides that if the
"Council" refers a matter on which a vote is blocked to the European Council by a
qualified majority vote, the matter is "referred to the European Council for
decision by unanimity." Article J.13(1)'s constructive abstention rule applies to
decisions of the "Council," that is to decisions of the Council of Ministers. By its
terms Article J. 13(1)'s constructive abstention rule is not applicable to a decision
of the European Council on a vote-blocked matter. The term "unanimity" as used
in Article J.13(2)s reference to European Council voting means absolute
unanimity. Within the European Council, decisions are taken by "common
accord," which means that all 16 of the members, the 15 Member States, and the
President of the Commission must agree to the decision with no abstentions and
no negative votes.
175.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text ("Member states will...
avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour
of that decision.").
176.
1&
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no such deference. By its terms, each Member is entitled to act
unilaterally and with reference only to its own interests when
deciding whether to block the taking of a vote on a measure.
Article J.13(2)'s voting procedure applies only to those
measures specified in the section, and the section is said to be in
derogation of the general voting rule of Article J. 13(1). The
general voting rule of Article J.13(1) provides that all actions
taken under Title V are to be adopted by unanimous vote of the
Council. Thus, all measures except those specified in Article
J. 13(2) are to be voted on under Article J. 13(1). The abstention
rule of Article 148(3) of the EC Treaty is restated in Article J. 13(1);
that is, abstention by a Member State does not prevent adoption
by unanimity. Abstention is deemed not to be a vote cast, and
17 7 It
unanimity among the votes cast is required for adoption.

was necessary to restate this rule since a qualification has been
placed on it for purposes of Title V, a qualification which may
make it easier to achieve unanimity and thus minimize deadlock
in CFSP matters.
An abstaining Member may qualify its
abstention by making a formal declaration. 178 If it does so, the
Member State will not be obligated to apply the decision taken.
The abstaining member would acknowledge that the decision is
adopted and is an act of the Union, but it would not be obliged to
apply or implement it. 17 9 In the spirit of mutual solidarity,
however, this Member would be obliged not to take any action
that is in conflict with or likely to impede the Union action.' 8 0
While the rule of Article J. 13(2) that provides for qualified
majority voting with the right to block a vote applies only to the
measures specified therein, these measures are in fact all of the
important
implementing measures: adoption
of common
positions, joint actions, measures implementing such, and
decisions based on common strategies. This qualified majority
procedure, which allows a single Member State to block a vote,
seems designed to favor the protection of the prerogatives of each
Member State rather than to encourage collaborative action. The
rationale for this procedure is that making a decision over the
opposition of a Member affects the legitimacy of the decision, at
least insofar as that Member is concerned. Under this rationale it
is better not to vote than to risk weakening the legitimacy of the

process, unless there is unanimous support for the measure. l81

177.
AT, art. J.13(1).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Reflection Group's Report, supranote 5, at
154-55. Some members
of the Reflection Group thought this approach was too open-ended, and that it
could be strengthened by some definition or delineation of which issues are

sufficiently fundamental to allow for its use. Id
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From another perspective, the procedure means that there can be
no effective response by the European Union to a foreign policy
situation without the unanimous support of all the Member
States.
Moreover, this procedure resurrects and legitimizes
within CFSP a controversial decision-making process employed by
the Council more than thirty years ago under the Luxembourg
Accords.182 In those Accords, the Member States agreed that
where voting within the Council was to be by majority vote and
when particularly important interests of one or more of the
Member States were at stake, the members of the Council would
endeavor to reach solutions that could be adopted by all the
members.' 8 3 The French position, which became the prevailing
practice, interpreted this understanding to mean that discussions
would continue until unanimous agreement was reached.184
Thus, no vote would be taken unless there was unanimous
support for the measure. 185
The significant matters to be agreed upon under Article
J. 13(1)'s procedure (unanimity with constructive abstention) are
the broader, overarching policy questions, decisions on the
definition of the principles and guidelines for the common foreign
and security policy, and the decisions on a common strategy.
Because of the constructive abstention rule of Article J.13(1), it
may

be

easier

to

reach

a

unanimous

decision

on

these

overarching matters. However, if an abstaining Member State is
not bound by such a decision, the efficacy of the decision is open
to question.' 8 6 It is true that this provision may lessen the
possibility of deadlock. The Union could proceed to define general
principles without the support of one or more Member States.

But any action to implement those principles could be thwarted
by the non-supporting Members under Article J. 13(2)'s rule that a
vote not be taken on the stated matters if a Member intends to
oppose it.

182. 1966 BULL. E.C. No. 3, 8.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3rd
ed. 1994), 20-21; STEPHEN WEATHERHILL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, 63-64 (1995). The Accords were controversial in part because they were
not found in the Treaty, and because they sanctioned, under the French view
which became the practice, a decision-making process at odds with the majority
voting provisions explicitly stated in the Treaty.
186. Moreover, since the AT assigns responsibility for some of the means of
pursuing CFSP to the European Council and responsibility for others to the
Council of Ministers, it is not clear how often the Council of Ministers would vote
on these overarching matters. See supranotes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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B. Institutions
The role of the European Council is made more explicit and is
heightened in the AT. By doing so, the AT shifts the balance in
the control of the CFSP process to a responsibility shared between
The
the European Council and the Council of Ministers.
policy
role,
and
the
European Council's role is the broader
Council of Minister's role has become more of an operational one.
The European Council is to define the principles and general
guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, as was its
But the European Council is also
role under the TEU. i 8 7
assigned the more specific role of deciding on common strategies
to be implemented by the Union in areas in which the Member
States have important common interests. 18 8 These strategies are
to be fairly concrete as they are to include objectives, duration,
In turn, the Council of
and means of implementation.1 89
Ministers makes (1) the decisions necessary for defining and
implementing the policies based on the general guidelines defined

by the European Council and (2) the decisions necessary to
implement the common strategies developed by the European
Council.190
This allocation of responsibility seems to assign the European
Council the prime role in the first two means by which the CFSP
is to be implemented, defining the principles and guidelines and
deciding on common strategies, 19 1 while the Council of Ministers
is assigned primary responsibility for implementing those
decisions through the adoption of common positions and joint
actions. 192 This more operational role of the Council of Ministers
is reinforced by its right to recommend common strategies to the
19 3
European Council.
The voting procedures of Article J. 13(1) and (2) have
for the
allocation of responsibilities. The
consequences
operational decisions which the Council of Ministers take will be
made pursuant to the rule of Article J.13(2)-qualified majority
with the right to block a vote. The more strategic decisions of
defining the principles and guidelines and deciding on common
strategies would be taken under Article J.13(1). But the
allocation of responsibilities set forth in Article J.3 dictates that
those more strategic decisions are to be made by the European

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

AT, art. J.3(1).
Id. art. J.3(2).

Id.
Id. art. J.3(3).
Id. art. J.3(I)-(2).
Id. art. J.3(3).
Id.
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Council, and the voting rules of Article J. 13 do not apply to it. 194
Thus, it seems that most of the decisions taken under Title V will
be under the qualified majority with right to block a vote
procedure.
From the allocation of responsibilities in Articles J.3 and 4, it
is not clear where the initiative for action lies. The European
Council's role of defining the principles of and general guidelines
for the policies and deciding on common strategies is set out fairly
clearly in Article J.3(1) and (2). The next subsection, Article
J.3(3), charges the Council of Ministers with making the decisions
necessary to define and implement the common policies on the
basis of the general guidelines. These sections seem to place the
initiative with the European Council. The sections could be read
to mean that the Council of Ministers should only act with respect
to a matter after the principles and general guidelines for it have
been set by the European Council. This would be similar to the
process that the TEU established for the taking of a joint
action. 19 s Article J.4, which deals with joint actions, contains no
reference to the European Council. In that section, the Council of
Ministers is charged with adopting joint action which "shall
address specific situations where operational action by the Union

is deemed to be required." 196 Here the initiative seems to be
placed with the Council of Ministers. This is a change from the
TEU, wherein the European Council's more immediate role was
97
with respect to joint actions. 1
From one perspective, this difference in initiative makes
sense. A common position generally requires the Member States
to implement it by national action. Accordingly, the coordinating
and initiative role of the European Council is more appropriate.
The joint action is generally a single act of the Union. In a sense,
it is an institutional act, rather than fifteen national
implementing acts, and having the initiative rest with the Council
of Ministers is more important. The AT provides no guidance as
to when the common policies should be implemented by a
common position rather than a joint action. The terms are
reasonably well-defined in the AT, however. 198 Thus, the choice
of means will depend on which of these two defined methods best
meets the objective. Either would be approved under the Article
J.13(2) procedure utilizing a qualified majority with the right to
block a vote.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See supranote 179.
See supranotes 45-47 and accompanying text.
AT, art. J.4(1).
See supranotes 45-47 and accompanying text.
See supranote 170.
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The AT creates an ambiguity with its introduction of the
common strategy. A common strategy is to be decided upon by

the European Council in areas in which the Member States have
important common interests. The common strategy adopted is to
of
means
and
duration,
objectives,
the
forth
set
accomplishment. 19 9 But a common position, a device by which
the "approach of the Union to a particular matter . . ."20 is
defined, is to be decided by the Council of Ministers voting under
Article J. 13(2).
The distinction between a common strategy and a common
position with respect to a particular situation may not be readily
apparent. The consequence of this ambiguity is heightened by
the AT's confusing voting procedures. Article J.13(1) provides
that voting within CFSP shall be by the Council of Ministers,
whereas Article J.3 provides that the European Council shall
decide on common strategies. The voting procedures of Article
J. 13(1) and (2) do not apply to the European Council. 2 0 ' Defining
a foreign policy matter as the subject of a common position allows
for its consideration under the clear rules of Article J. 13(2), while
defining the matter as the object of a common strategy leaves the
voting procedure unstated.
The Council is given the express and operational power to
appoint a special representative with a mandate for particular
issues.20 2 The Council had previously made such assignments
For example, it appointed a special
under the TEU.
3
representative for the administration of the city of Mostar 20 and
2° 4
In these instances
an envoy to the Middle East Peace Process.
20 S
the Council made the appointment through a joint action.
Article C of the TEU obligated the Council and the
Commission, each within its sphere of competency, to assure
consistency of policy and action. The AT expands on this theme.

199. AT, art. J.3(2).
200. Id. art. J.5.
201. See supra note 179.
202. AT,art. J.8(5).
203. Council Decision 96/442/CFSP of 15 July 1996 On the Nomination of
a Special Envoy of the European Union in the City of Mostar, 1996 O.J. (L 185) 2.
204. Council Decision 96/676/CFSP of 25 November 1996 In relation to the

Nomination of an EU Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process, 1996 O.J.
(L 315) 1.
205. Under the TEU such appointments were made by a joint action, since
common positions and joint actions were the means by which the CFSP was
carried out. The AT seems to allow for the appointment separate from either,
although obviously the appointment could still be through a joint action.
However, if the appointment is not made through a joint action, the voting
procedure for the matter is not clear: the appointment might come within either
one of the specified measures to be voted on under Article J.13(2), or it might
come under the general rules of Article J. 13(1).
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In the revised Article C, the Union is charged with ensuring the
consistency "as a whole in the context of its external relations,
security, economic and development policies." 20 6 Presumably,
this sentence refers both to consistency among various spheres,
such as external relations and economic and development
policies, as well as consistency among the three pillars in the
The Council and
approach taken on a particular issue.
Commission are called upon to assure such consistency and to
cooperate to this end. 20 7 To emphasize this point specifically with

respect to CFSP, the AT, in its version of Title V, charges the
Council with the responsibility of ensuring the unity, consistency,
and effectiveness of action by the Union. 20 8 As was the case
under the TEU, there is no reference in this Article to the
Commission.2 0 9 This exhortation to the Council is contained in
article J.3, which sets out the Council's role in implementing the
common policy on the basis of guidelines from the European
Council. Presumably, this reference is to consistency of activities
within the CFSP, not to consistency between the CFSP and the
EC, whereas the more general charge of Article C would address
consistency among the pillars and spheres of activity.
The Commission's role in CFSP has not been significantly
The
It is to be fully associated with the work.2 10
altered.
Commission and the Member States may submit questions and
proposals to the Council,2 1 1 and the Commission and the Member
States may request an extraordinary meeting of the Council to
consider emergency matters. 2 12 These provision are all the same
as under the TEU. One additional prerogative is that the Council
may request the Commission to submit proposals to ensure
implementation of joint actions.2 1 3 The Commission's role in fact
has been diminished to the extent that the AT creates new
responsibilities within the CFSP process and assigns them to
2 14
another entity.

206.

AT, art. C, replacing TEU, art. C,

2.

207. Article C of the TEU called for the Council and the Commission to
achieve this consistency.
208. AT, art. J.3(3), 3.
209.
It had been suggested that the likelihood of achieving consistency
would be enhanced if the Commission were also charged together with the

151. Presumably this
Council. Reflection Group's Report, supra note 5, at
suggestion was not adopted out of a concern that the second pillar would become
too institutionalized. However, the Commission did have such a charge under the
EPC process. SEA, art. 30.5.
210. AT, art. J.17.

211.
212.
J.8(4).
213.
214.

Id. art.J.12.
I. art. J.12(2). The TEU contained a similar procedure. TEU, art.
Id. art. J.4(4).
See infranotes 227-31 and accompanying text.
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The administrative organization of the CFSP has been
strengthened in several respects.
As under the TEU, the
Presidency represents the Union in matters coming within
CFSP. 2 15
The Presidency is responsible for implementing
decisions taken as well as representing the Union's position in
international organizations and conferences. 2 16 The troika, which
under the TEU was to assist the Presidency (the immediate past
and incoming President together with the Commission), 2 17 has
been replaced by the incoming Member State as President and the
2 18
Commission.
In an effort to assure continuity, and in support of the
Member State holding the office of President of the Council, the
AT assigns the Secretary General of the Council the significant
role of assisting the two tasks of representation and
implementation. 2 19 The Secretary General is to "exercise the
function of High Representative for the common foreign and
security policy.2 2 0 Creation of this responsibility was in response
to a broadly based concern that the administration of CFSP
needed strengthening.2 2 1 This position could be viewed as the
"figurehead" of CFSP,2 2 2 which may be an apt characterization.
Given the structure and the role of the European Council, the
Council of Ministers, and the Presidency in CFSP, it seems
unlikely that the Secretary General will become the "CFSP czar."
However, the AT does assign the General Secretary an ambitious
and prominent role in the CFSP process. As High Commissioner
for common foreign and security policy, the Secretary General is
to assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of
common foreign and security policy by contributing to the
223
formulation, preparation, and implementation of the policy.
When requested to do so by the President, the Secretary General
can conduct negotiations with third parties. 2 2 4 At base, however,
in this role the Secretary General is to assist the Council and the
Presidency.
In so far as this role relates to the Presidency, the
involvement of the Secretary General will be redefined every six

215.
216.

AT, art. J.8(1).
Id. art. J.8(2).

217.

TEU, art. J.5(3).

218.
219.

AT, art. J.8(4).
Id. art. J.8(3).

220.
221.

Id.
See Reflection Group's Report, supranote 5, at

156. The suggestion

that this support be provided by increasing the Commission's involvement was
rejected. Id.

222.
223.
224.

Langrish, supranote 3, at 13.
AT, art. J.16.
Id.
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months as the Presidency rotates to another Member State. 225
The Secretary General's role as High Commissioner will probably
be more prominent when the office of the Presidency is held by
certain Member States and less prominent when held by others.
As it relates to the Council as a whole, this role will be more
stable and will allow for a more continuous monitoring of the
CFSP process than was possible under the TEU.

Another provision intended to bolster the administration of
the CFSP is the creation of a policy planning and early warning
unit within the General Secretariat of the Council. 2 2 6 This unit is
under the control of the Secretary General in his capacity as High
Representative for the CFSP, and it is staffed by personnel from
the Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission, and the
Western European Union. 2 27 Its tasks include monitoring and
analyzing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, assessing
and warning about events that may have repercussions for Union
policies, and producing policy option papers that could include
recommendations and strategies for CFSP. 22 8
The Political
Committee established under the TEU is carried over into the AT,
with virtually the same function. 2 29 The constitutive documents
make no reference to the relationship between the policy
planning/early warning unit and the Political Committee, but the
overlap is apparent.
The concerns regarding the need for more administrative
support and continuity of the CFSP have been taken seriously in
the AT. The High Commissioner and the policy planning/early
warning unit provide the CFSP with more sustained personnel,
thereby improving its administration and effectiveness. From
another point of view, however, the intergovernmental nature of
the CFSP has been altered as these two augmentations add an
institutional dimension to the process that was previously absent.
C. OtherProvisions

One unresolved aspect of CFSP as it existed under the TEU
was the negotiation and execution of any formal agreements
necessary to effect a joint position. Under the TEU, the Union is

225. See MATHIJSEN, supranote 9, at 51.
226. Declaration of the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early
Warning Unit. 1997 O.J. (C340) 132.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. AT, art. J.15; see supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text
(describing the role of the Political Committee under the TEU).
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not a legal person. 230 In contrast, the EC by virtue of Article 210
of the EC Treaty does have legal personality. 23 1 Consequently,
the Union, through the Commission, may negotiate agreements
within Community competence, and the Council through the

President can execute them on behalf of the Community. Under
the TEU, if an agreement is required to effect joint action within
the CFSP, the Community may enter into it only in the unlikely
event that the agreement's subject matter is within the
Community's competency. Otherwise the agreement would have
to be negotiated and executed by the Member States and its
effectiveness would depend on the ratification process within each
of the Member States.
Article J.14 of the AT is an attempt at overcoming this
cumbersome situation. It allows the negotiation of agreements by
the Union which might be binding on the Member States. By the
terms of this Article, if an agreement with other states or with
international organizations is necessary to implement a CFSP
decision, the Council, acting unanimously, can request the
Presidency (with the assistance of the Commission) to negotiate
the agreement. 232 The final text must be unanimously approved
by the Council, 23 3 acting on a recommendation from the
Presidency.2 3 4 The agreement is not binding on any Member
whose representative in the Council states that the agreement can
only be binding if its internal constitutional procedures are
satisfied.2 3 5
The other Members may acknowledge that the
23 6
agreement provisionally binds them.
This Article does not confer legal personality on the Union,
and the Article's exact legal consequence is unclear.2 3 7
The
provision authorizing the Union to negotiate and conclude
agreements, coupled with the Member States' acknowledgment

that they may be bound by such agreements without separately
executing or ratifying them, does seem to vest the Union with

230. See Reflection Group's Report, supra note 5, at
150; MCGOLDRICK,
supra note 31, at 36-39; M.R. Eaton, Common Foreign Security Policy, in LEGAL
IssUES, supranote 28, 215, at 224.
231. E.C. Treaty, as amended, art. 210; see MACLEOD, supranote 91, at 2936.
232. AT, art. J.14.
233. Presumably, Article J.13(1)'s unanimity with constructive abstention
rule applies.
234. AT, art. J.14.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. For suggestions to the Intergovernmental Conference that the treaty
confer legal personality see Reflection Group'sReport, supranote 5, at 150. Five
such suggestions were rejected in favor of this Article.
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some form of legal personality. 23 8 Alternatively, it may be argued
that the Council is concluding these agreements merely as an
agent for the Member States; and because it is the Member States
which may be bound by the agreements, there is no implication of
a separate legal personality for the Union. 2 39 Moreover, the
Article provides that Member States that do not constitutionally
require separate ratification of agreements may acknowledge that
they are bound by the agreement. 2 4 ° Apparently, they are also
24 1
free not to acknowledge that the agreement binds them.
This issue of legal personality for the Union as well as the
status of any such agreements is muddied by a Declaration the
signatories attached to the AT.
In this Declaration, the
signatories indicate their understanding that agreements
resulting from Article J.14 do not imply any transfer of
competency from the Member States to the Union.2 42 Essentially,
in Article J.14 the Member States have agreed that unless
required by internal constitutional procedures,
separate
ratification by them of an agreement concluded by the Council is
not required. As a result, they acknowledge that they may be
bound by the agreement. But it is not clear whether the Union is
primarily bound, and the accepting Member States are bound as
members of the Union, or whether only the Member States are
bound.
The AT has placed the financing of the CFSP on a much surer
footing. Under the TEU, the financing of each CFSP had to be
separately negotiated. 2 43
Pursuant to an Inter-Institutional

Agreement, CFSP matters, administrative and operational, are to
be charged to the EC budget, unless the Council otherwise
agrees. Based on the Commission's annual preliminary draft
budget, the Parliament and the Council will annually agree upon
the amount to be set aside for CFSP expenditures and the
appropriate allocation of that sum among the various types of
activities. 244

238.

It can be inferred from the negotiation process that the conclusion of

such agreements is on behalf of the Union. See Langrish, supranote 3, at 13-14
(arguing that Articles J.14 and K.10 imply that the Council may conclude
agreements on behalf of the Union).
239. Manin, supranote 3, at 16 n.66.
240. See supra note 239.
241. See iL
242. Declaration in Relating to Articles J.14 and K.10 of the Treaty on
European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 131.
243. Commission Opinion, supranote 5, at 33.
244. 1& at C.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The AT significantly alters some aspects of Union law and
practice. 2 45
Its provisions regarding CFSP are much more
modest. Issues critical for the success of CFSP were put on hold
for another day, specifically the unanimous voting provisions.
Nevertheless, improvements were made to the process through
the strengthening of administrative support and budgeting.
Beyond that, the Intergovernmental Conference and the AT must
both be viewed as a step in an ongoing process of definition of
common policies. Hopefully, the provisions of the new Title V, the
collaborative efforts of the Member States, and the Council and
the Commission's work within the treaty framework over the next
years will add to the confidence base among the participants
necessary to develop the shared goals which may make the next
steps possible.

245. This is particularly true of the provisions bringing asylum, immigration
and employment principles of the third pillar within EC jurisdiction and
expanding the legislative role of the Parliament.

